are the same, and in a sense they are not; for the essence of white is not the same as the man or the white Olympique Lyonnais man, but it is the same as the attribute white.)
The absurdity of the separation would appear also if one were to assign a name to each of the essences; for there would be yet another essence besides the original one, e.g. to the essence of horse there will belong a second essence. Yet why should not some things be their essences Steven Kampfer Tröja from the start, since essence is substance? But indeed not only are a thing and its essence one, but the formula of them is also the same, as is clear even from what has been said; for it is not by accident that the essence of one, and the one, are one. Finsko Dresy Further, if they are to be different, the process will go on to infinity; for we shall have (1) the essence of one, and (2) the one, so that to terms of the former POLO Hollande kind the same argument will be applicable.
Clearly, then, each primary and self-subsistent thing is one and Maillot Modrić the same as its essence. The sophistical objections to this position, and the question whether Socrates and Chris Kreider Tröjor to be Socrates are the same thing, are obviously answered by the same solution; for there is no difference either in the Maillot Belgique standpoint from which the question would be POLO Ajax asked, or in that from which one could answer it successfully. We have explained, then, in what sense each thing is the same as its essence and in what sense it is not.
Book Survetement Man city VII Chapter 7
Of things that come to be, some come Boca Juniors Dresy to be by nature, some by art, some spontaneously. Now everything that comes to be comes to be by the agency of something and from something and comes to be something. And the something which I say it comes to be may be found in any category; it may come to be either a ‘this’ or of some size or of some quality or somewhere.
Now natural comings to be are the comings to be of those things which come to be by nature; and that out of which they come to be is what we call matter; and that by which they come to be is something which exists naturally; and the something which they come to be is a man or a plant or one of the things of this kind, which we Shea Weber Tröja say are substances if anything is-all things produced either by nature or by art have matter; for each of them is capable both of being and of not being, and this capacity is the matter in each-and, in general, both that from which they are produced is nature, and the type according to which they are produced is nature (for that which is produced, e.g. a plant or an animal, has a nature), and so is that by which they are produced — the so-called ‘formal’ nature, which is specifically the same (though this is in another individual); for man begets man.
Thus, then, are natural products produced; all other productions are called ‘makings’. And all makings proceed either from art or from a faculty or from thought. Some of them happen also spontaneously or by luck New York City FC just as natural products sometimes do; for there also the same things sometimes are produced without seed as well as from seed. Concerning these cases, thelinks:
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